The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

四川省人民政府


四川省人民政府令

第266号



　　《四川省建设工程抗御地震灾害管理办法》已经2013年3月19日省人民政府第4次常务会议通过，现予公布，自2013年6月1日起施行。



四川省人民政府办公厅


2013年4月2日





附件： 四川省建设工程抗御地震灾害管理办法

http://imgs.sc.gov.cn/DocAnnex/2013/4/7/3ebbebeb39034100964e11ccc13d25ea.rar




四川省建设工程抗御地震灾害管理办法


第一章 总 则

第一条 为有效抗御并减轻地震灾害，根据《中华人民共和国建筑法》和《中华人民共和国防震减灾法》等法律、法规，结合四川省实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本省行政区域内的建设工程的抗震设防，适用本办法。
前款所称建设工程，包括抗震设防区的建设工程以及非抗震设防区学校、医院等人员密集场所及重要公共建筑。
第三条 建设工程应当依照国家和省的抗震设防要求、建筑工程抗震设防分类标准、建设工程抗震设计规范和有关专业建设工程抗震设计规范的强制性规定进行抗震设防。
第四条 县级以上住房城乡建设主管部门负责房屋建筑和市政基础设施建设工程的抗震设防监督管理。
县级以上交通运输、水利、能源、农业等部门及铁路、电力等相关单位按照各自职责负责有关专业建设工程的抗震设防监督管理。
地震工作主管部门负责确定抗震设防要求及监督管理。
乡（镇）人民政府负责本辖区房屋建筑和村民住宅的抗震设防指导和监督。
第二章 城乡抗震防灾规划
第五条 抗震设防区的城市总体规划应当包括城市抗震防灾规划。
抗震设防区的城镇体系规划、镇总体规划和乡、村规划应当包括抗震防灾专篇。
第六条 省、市（州）住房城乡建设、城乡规划主管部门会同地震、水利、交通运输、通信、电力、铁路部门共同编制省域、市（州）域城镇体系规划中的抗震防灾专篇。
市（州）、县（市、区）住房城乡建设、城乡规划主管部门组织编制本行政区域内的城市抗震防灾规划，应当委托具有城乡规划编制或建筑设计资质的单位承担具体编制工作。
抗震设防区的大型工矿、电力企业和易产生次生灾害的生产、贮存企业应当编制抗震防灾规划。
第七条 城镇体系规划中的抗震防灾专篇内容应当包括：对区域性的水源地、库坝、油库、燃气储备及调压站、铁路、公路、桥梁、电力、电子信息和通信、油气干线、输水干线等重大工程和生命线工程的抗震性能评价、抗震对策措施，震后地区、城市间的相互协调和支援。
第八条 编制城市抗震防灾规划应当征求有关部门、单位、专家及公众意见，符合国家《城市抗震防灾规划标准》，并满足下列要求：
（一）根据规模等级确定城市交通出入口的数量，确定城市生命线工程，并符合发生灾害时疏散人群和救灾的要求；
（二）确定作为紧急避险、疏散转移或临时安置的城市绿地、公共建筑和场所；
（三）供水、燃气、供电、通信、污水处理等重要基础设施的建设，应当满足抗震设防等级和震后迅速恢复运营的要求，并符合防止和控制爆炸、火灾、水害等次生灾害和预防二次污染的要求；
（四）设市城市、县（市、区）人民政府所在地的镇应当确定第二水源和应急气源，并确定至少两处道路交通便利的空旷场地或避险绿地，满足直升机空中运输与救援的要求。
第九条 城市抗震防灾规划中的下列内容应当作为建设用地规划和建设工程项目选址的控制性条件：
（一）抗震设防标准；
（二）建设用地要求；
（三）应急疏散通道和应急避难场所建设要求；
（四）应急保障必需的供水、排水、供电、消防、通讯、交通基础设施；
（五）重要建筑及建筑密集地区的抗震防灾措施。
第十条 省住房城乡建设主管部门负责组织设市城市的抗震防灾规划和省域、市（州）域城镇体系规划中抗震防灾专篇的技术审查，法律、法规另有规定的，从其规定。
市（州）住房城乡规划建设主管部门负责组织县级政府所在地镇的抗震防灾规划的技术审查。
县（市、区）住房城乡规划建设主管部门负责镇和乡村规划中抗震防灾专篇的技术审查。
省行业主管部门会同住房城乡建设主管部门指导大型工矿、电力等生产企业和易产生次生灾害的生产、贮存企业编制抗震防灾规划。
第三章 工程抗震设防
第十一条 住房城乡建设、发展改革、交通运输、水利等主管部门负责指导建设工程抗震设防标准的实施。
新建、扩建、改建建设工程，应当按照国家工程建设强制性标准和法律、法规规定进行抗震设防。
第十二条 新建工程抗震设防应当按照特殊设防类、重点设防类、标准设防类、适度设防类的标准要求划分确定。建设工程的可行性研究、场址选择、工程勘察、设计、施工图审查、施工、监理、竣工、验收及使用应当执行抗震设防分类标准和工程建设相关技术标准。
任何单位和个人不得降低工程抗震设防标准。
第十三条 新建工程应当按照建筑抗震设计规范、构筑物抗震设计规范、建筑工程抗震设防分类标准以及铁路、公路、水利、电力设施、水运、空运、核电厂、石油化工等专业抗震设计规范进行抗震设计。
建筑抗震设计规范、建筑工程抗震设防分类标准界定的特殊设防类，属于重大建设工程和可能发生严重次生灾害的建设工程的范围，应当在可行性研究阶段进行地震安全性评价，并按照经审
定的地震安全性评价报告所确定的抗震设防要求进行抗震设计。
法律、法规另有规定的从其规定。
第十四条 抗震设防区内的学校、医院等人员密集场所的建设工程应当根据建筑工程抗震设防分类标准中的重点设防类设防。抗震设防烈度为9度时，应当按比 9度更高的要求采取抗震
措施，按本地区抗震设防烈度确定其地震作用。
非抗震设防区内的学校、医院等人员密集场所及重要公共建筑的建设工程按抗震设防烈度6度进行设防。
第十五条 对抗震设防区的基础设施、市政公用基础设施和地震时可能发生严重次生灾害的建设项目以及超出工程建设抗震设防标准适用范围的建设工程进行可行性研究时，县级以上交通
运输、水利、电力、住房城乡建设等相关主管部门应当根据项目类别组织相关专家对工程选址、选线及设计方案进行抗震设防专项论证。
第十六条 抗震设防区的下列建设工程，设计单位在初步设计阶段中应当编制抗震设防设计专篇；由建设单位根据项目类别报省住房城乡建设、交通运输、水利、铁路等主管部门进行抗震设
防专项审查：
（一）超限高层建筑工程；
（二）《建筑工程抗震设防分类标准》中特殊设防类（甲类）和中型以上重点设防类（乙类）建设工程；
（三）全新活动断裂带附近，跨度超过150m 的特大桥梁和长度大于3000m 的特长隧道、结构或者地基复杂的大型城市桥梁、轨道交通和供电、通风设施，超过1万平方米的地下公共设施，震后可能发生严重次生灾害的供水、燃气、供电、通信设施共同敷设的共同沟工程、污水集中处理设施和生活垃圾集中处理设施；
（四）穿越抗震设防区的铁路、公路和桥梁及客运候车楼、行车调度、监控、运输、信号、通信、供电、供水建筑；
（五）超出工程建设抗震设防标准适用范围的房屋建筑和市政公用设施。
按规定应当进行初步设计审查的建设工程，其抗震设防专项审查应当与初步设计审查合并进行。法律、法规对超限高层建筑工程另有规定的，从其规定。
第十七条 依法应当进行抗震设防专项论证、审查的建设工程，设计单位应按照抗震设防要求和工程建设标准以及抗震设防专项论证、审查意见进行设计。施工图审查机构应当核查抗震设
防专项论证、审查意见的落实情况；对未通过抗震设防专项论证、审查，或未按专项论证、审查意见进行施工图设计的建设工程，施工图审查不予通过。
第十八条 施工图审查机构应当依照国家标准对工程勘察文件、施工图设计文件、抗震鉴定报告进行审查，并承担审查责任。
新建、扩建、改建建设工程的抗震设防设计应当作为施工图审查的内容。
第十九条 施工图审查机构在技术审查中，对不符合国家工程建设强制性标准、抗震设防分类要求的，应当书面通知建设单位更改。未更改的，不得颁发施工图审查合格书。
第二十条 建设单位对建设工程的抗震设计、施工的全过程负责，不得有下列情形：
（一）明示或暗示设计单位降低抗震设防标准的；
（二）在工程设计合同或合同以外，暗示、明示或附加条款限定工程含钢量的；
（三）因施工图审查不合格，通过变更施工图审查机构逃避整改责任的；
（四）擅自更改或者取消抗震设防措施的；
（五）选用不符合施工图设计文件和国家有关标准规定的材料、构配件和设备的。
第二十一条 勘察单位应当按照工程建设强制性标准进行勘察，对提供的勘察文件的真实性和准确性负责，并不得有下列情形：
（一）岩土工程勘察现场工作深度达不到国家标准规定的；
（二）弄虚作假，提供虚假岩土工程勘察成果的；
（三）岩土工程勘察报告中提出的场地抗震有利地段、不利地段和危险地段的划分违反国家标准和不符合工程场地实际情况的；
（四）岩土工程勘察报告中提出的抗震场地类别划分、液化评价等内容违反国家标准和不符合工程场地实际情况的；
（五）岩土工程勘察报告中提出的地基基础评价及建议违反国家标准和不符合工程场地实际情况的；
（六）其他违反国家工程建设强制性标准进行岩土工程勘察的情形。
建设单位应当在施工图设计文件审查前，将工程勘察文件委托施工图审查机构进行审查，审查通过后报住房城乡建设、水利、交通运输、铁路等相关主管部门备案。国家对专业工程另有规定
的，从其规定。
第二十二条 工程设计单位对抗震设计质量以及出具的施工图设计文件准确性负责，不得有下列情形：
（一）违反抗震设防要求的；
（二）违反国家标准关于抗震设防类别划分规定的；
（三）违反国家标准采取抗震设防措施和确定地震作用的；
（四）未执行抗震设防专项论证、抗震设防专项审查意见的；
（五）使用失效旧标准、旧规范的；
（六）违反法律法规规定的其他情形的。
第二十三条 乡村公共建筑、基础设施和统一规划、统一建设的村民住宅，应当依照工程建设标准、基本建设程序进行规划、设计和施工，达到抗震设防要求。
第二十四条 乡村公共建筑和基础设施设计应当由具有工程设计资质的单位承担，不得委托私人设计，并纳入建设监督管理范畴。
第二十五条 村民住宅应按照镇、乡、村规划和《四川汶川地震灾后农村房屋恢复重建选址技术导则》、《四川省牧民定居点规划选址技术导则》的规定选址，避让地震破裂带、断裂带，避让地质灾害隐患点和易发生区域。
村民建造住宅可以选用住房城乡建设主管部门提供的农村住宅设计方案通用图集，并根据《四川省农村居住建筑抗震构造图集》的要求进行施工。村民可委托有资质的工程设计单位进行设
计，也可以委托注册建筑师、注册结构工程师等具有工程建设执业资格的人员设计，不得无设计进行施工建设。
第二十六条 村民经批准在宅基地新建、改建住宅达到下列条件之一的，村民应当委托建筑施工企业、劳务分包企业承担施工，并向乡（镇）人民政府申报，纳入工程质量监督：
（一）三层及以上的；
（二）300平方米以上的；
（三）30万元投资以上的；
（四）六米跨度以上的。
乡村建筑工匠按规定承担两层及以下住宅建造。严禁无资质的单位和个人承担村民住宅抗震设计、施工。
乡（镇）人民政府应当指定村镇建设管理人员、乡村规划师及建筑专业技术人员对村民建房进行指导、监督。
第二十七条 施工企业、劳务分包企业和建筑工匠应当按图施工，落实抗震设防措施，保证质量，并对承担的村民住宅抗震设防、施工质量负责。
第二十八条 在乡村建设、农村居住建筑中推广应用具有民族特色、抗震性能较好的结构形式和建造方式。
第二十九条 鼓励开展建筑抗震新技术、新工艺、新材料、新设备的科学技术研究，推广应用符合本地实际的减震、隔震结构、钢结构、装配结构、木结构等建筑结构抗震技术。
县级以上人民政府及其有关部门应当按照国家规定推进抗震设防新技术、新工艺、新材料、新设备的应用。
省住房城乡建设等有关行政主管部门应当依法发布建筑抗震新技术、新工艺、新材料、新设备的科技成果推广项目、适用范围和限制、禁止使用的技术。
第三十条 采用减震、隔震新技术的建筑工程设计应当由减震、隔震技术研究单位会同具有甲、乙级工程设计资质的设计单位共同完成，并编制减震、隔震计算书。已有减震、隔震技术设计成果的设计单位可以独立完成设计。
第三十一条 工程建设项目的勘察设计采用抗震新技术、专有技术、特定专利技术的，由建设单位报经发展改革部门核准，可以直接发包。
第三十二条 省住房城乡建设、铁路、交通运输、水利等主管部门负责建设工程勘察、设计抗震新技术的培训，作为执业人员继续教育的重要内容。
第四章 工程施工监理竣工验收
第三十三条 建设工程各方责任主体应当执行法律、法规规定的基本建设程序和工程建设技术标准以及工程质量安全的规定。
建设单位、勘察、设计、施工、工程监理企业，项目管理公司、工程质量监测机构、抗震鉴定及施工图审查机构，应当遵守有关建设工程抗震设防的法律、法规和工程建设强制性标准的规定，保证建设工程的抗震设防质量。
第三十四条 施工单位应当按照施工图设计文件和工程建设强制性标准进行施工，并对施工质量负责。不得擅自修改施工图设计文件，不得偷工减料。
建设单位、施工单位应当选用符合施工图设计文件和国家有关标准规定的材料、构配件和设备。
第三十五条 工程监理单位应当按照施工图设计文件和工程建设强制性标准实施监理，并对施工质量承担监理责任。
第三十六条 建设工程竣工后，建设单位应依法组织勘察、设计、施工、监理单位对工程项目进行竣工验收。工程质量监督机构对验收程序和工程质量进行监督。
建设单位应当在法定时限内对经竣工验收合格的建设工程依法办理竣工验收备案。
第五章 既有建筑抗震使用
第三十七条 已经建成的建设工程，未采取抗震设防措施或者抗震设防措施未达到抗震设防要求且未列入近期改造、拆除计划的，房屋建筑的使用者或产权人应当依法委托具有相应工程设
计资质的单位按照有关法律规定、现行抗震鉴定标准和必要的检测报告进行抗震鉴定、加固。
第三十八条 鉴定结论确认采取加固可以达到抗震设防标准的学校、医院等人员密集的公共建筑，按照重点设防类抗震设防标准改造加固。
第三十九条 工程抗震加固应当纳入基本建设管理程序，执行工程建设标准；抗震鉴定与加固费用由工程项目使用者或产权人承担。
工程抗震加固应当与城市近期建设规划、产权人的房屋维修计划和企业发展规划相结合。
有重大文物价值和纪念意义工程的抗震加固，应当注意保持其原有风貌。
第四十条 产权人和使用人不得擅自变动或者破坏建筑抗震结构、隔震、减震装置部件和安全监测系统、观测系统设施，削弱工程抗震能力。
房屋建筑和市政基础设施在合理使用年限内，因各种因素使工程抗震能力受损的，或者因改变原设计使用性质导致荷载增加或需提高抗震设防类别的，产权人或使用权人应当委托有相应资
质的单位进行抗震验算、修复或加固。需要进行工程检测的，应委托具有相应资质的单位进行检测。
第六章 法律责任
第四十一条 违反本办法的行为，其他法律、法规已有规定的，从其规定。
第四十二条 违反本办法第十六条规定，工程设计单位在初步设计阶段没有编制抗震设防设计专篇，由县级以上住房城乡建设行政主管部门或者其他有关行政主管部门责令改正，处5000元
以上2万元以下的罚款。
第四十三条 违反本办法第十九条规定，施工图审查机构违反有关规定颁发施工图审查合格书的，由县级以上住房城乡建设行政主管部门或者其他有关行政主管部门责令改正，并处3万元
的罚款。造成损失的，应当承担赔偿责任。
第四十四条 建设单位违反第二十条规定的，有第二项、第三项、第四项情形的，由县级以上住房城乡建设行政主管部门或者其他有关行政主管部门处1万元以上3万元以下的罚款。
第四十五条 设计单位违反本办法第二十二条规定的，施工图设计文件无效，有第四项、第五项情形的，并由县级以上住房城乡建设行政主管部门或者其他有关行政主管部门处1万元以上 3
万元以下的罚款。
第四十六条 国家工作人员在建设工程抗震设防监督管理工作中玩忽职守、滥用职权、徇私舞弊的，依法给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第七章 附 则
第四十七条 本办法所称抗震设防区，是指地震基本烈度6度及以上的地区（地震动峰值加速度≥0.05g的地区）。
本办法所称非抗震设防区，是指地震基本烈度小于6度的地区。
本办法所称超限高层建筑工程，是指超出国家现行规范、规程所规定的适用高度和适用结构类型的高层建筑工程，体型特别不规则的高层建筑工程，以及有关规范、规程规定应当进行抗震专项审查的高层建筑工程。
本办法所称生命线工程，是指对城镇功能、生活和生产活动有重大影响的供电、供气、供水、交通、通讯、医疗卫生、消防等工程系统。
本办法所称严重次生灾害，是指强烈地震破坏引发放射性污染、洪灾、火灾、爆炸、剧毒或强腐蚀性物质大量泄漏、高危险传染病、病毒扩散等灾难性灾害。
第四十八条 本办法自2013年6月1日起实施。